Introduction
The activities of trade facilitation agenda in global trade has been proposed greatly at the international level, such as at the WTO, the WCO, OECD, UNCTAD, UN/CEFACT, UN/ECE, the World Bank, ITC, UNCITRAL, IMO, and ICAO, etc.; at regional level, such as NAFTA, APEC, European Union, and other FTAs; and at NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs) level, such as IATA, ICS, IRU and the ICC (Staples, 1998; Grainger, 2011 Grainger, , 2012 Grainger, , 2014 Mustra, 2011) . 1 At international level, the WTO is the only multilateral trade organisation, with 164 members and autonomous customs agencies, which deals with global rules of trade. Generally known, developing countries and LDCs represent two-thirds of the WTO members.
Awareness of how to reduce unnecessary trade costs at the border and introduce certain elements of trade facilitation, by concluding such a multilateral agreement on trade facilitation, in order to tackle the costs, has become a significant part of prolonged discussion within the WTO Doha Round Negotiations (Duval, 2007; Scott and Wilkinson, 2011; Ismail, 2008; Wilkinson, 2006 Wilkinson, , 2009 2 , particularly the implementation-related issues and concerns (Finger and Wilson, 2007) 3 and a discussion of needs, priorities, and costs associated for making provision of technical assistance and capacity building of a developed countries and donors for developing countries in the implementation (Finger, 2008; McLinden, 2006) . 4 proposals from some of the WTO Members for improved performance have been tabled and predicted an outlook on the future of the negotiations (Shin, 2001; Finger, 2008; Bolhofer, 2007) . 5 Trade facilitation agenda in the WTO has been raised as a negotiated discussion in a multilateral working group, as one of the four, so called "Singapore issues", the other three working groups were trade and investment, competition policy, and transparency in government procurement, at the first WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996. After several years of exploratory work, the WTO members formally agreed to launch negotiations on trade facilitation on 1 August 2004, on the basis of modalities in Annex D of the work programme of Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 2001, the so-called "July Package" (Neufeld, 2014) . 6 However, the understanding of trade facilitation has changed from its initial description at 1996 Singapore Ministerial as "the simplification of trade procedures" to a more narrow definition of DDA 2001, which described as "the movement, release and clearance of goods" (Woo, 2003). 7 In the WTO negotiations, the discussion of trade facilitation covers therefore The WTO TFA has three sections: Section I contains provisions for expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit, clarifies and improves the relevant articles V, VIII and X of GATT 1994, and also sets outs provisions for customs cooperation. Section II contains Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) provisions that allow developing countries and LDCs to determine when they will implement individual provisions of the Agreement and to identify provisions that they will only be able to implement upon the receipt of technical assistance and support for capacity building. Lastly, section III contains provisions that establish a permanent committee on trade facilitation at the WTO, require members to have a national committee to facilitate domestic coordination and implementation of the provisions of the Agreement. 10 However, while waiting to come enter into force or if the WTO TFA fails to enter into force, it could still form the basis for a primary soft law agreement, even acting as a precursor to a legally binding treaty instrument for all of the Members (Footer, 2010) . 11 On the other hand, some scholar argued that the WTO TFA is another example of form without substance because of its failure to bring reciprocity to bear on the acceptance of discipline over trade controls and failure to give operational content within the GATT/WTO legal system to provision of assistance to developing countries (Finger, 2014) . 12 Nevertheless, once the WTO TFA enters into force and developing countries put a lot of resources in the implementation, the WTO TFA has the potential to reduce total global trade costs by a significant amount and streamlining the flow of trade across borders and promote economic development and raise the standards of living in these countries (Hamanaka, 2014; Elms, 2014; Khanderia-Yadav, 2015) . 13 The WTO TFA provides flexibility for developing members by allowing them to accept only the legal obligations they attach as "schedules". Therefore Category C, obligations that are inherently aspirational, or of a soft-law character (Elliason, 2015) . 14 Implementing the WTO TFA is another big issue that will hamper every WTO Members in the future. The devil is in detail. In the WTO TFA, the devil is the implementation. The cost of implementing trade facilitation through the WTO TFA is difficult to quantify for two reasons; first, trade facilitation reforms are rarely carried out independently of other broader policy objectives, such as customs modernization and secondly, costs may vary considerably depending on the type of trade facilitation measures considered, such as diagnostic, regulatory, institutional, training, equipment and infrastructure, awareness-raising, political will and operational details (The WTO, 2015) . 15 Implementation issues also bring implications, such as legislative, administrative, and procedural implications (legal framework implications), potential infrastructure implications, financial and other resource implications, as well as technical assistance and capacity building requirements (Widdowson, 2005; Hamanaka, 2014) . 16 Apart from the WTO TFA, there is actually international treaty which was Widdowson, 2005; Grainger, 2011; Wolffgang and Kafeero, 2014; Khanderia-Yadav, 2015) . 17 In the WTO negotiations on trade facilitation, there was argument that the WTO should "give focus to the simplification of trade procedures by concentrating on customs modernisation" and strengthen the WCO RKC to be more binding, as it is the single most comprehensive prospect for true international trade facilitation. In this regard, the WTO should have incorporated the WCO RKC into its structure (Staples, 1998; Masserlin and Zarrouk, 2000) . However, the WTO is the only organisation providing a credible framework for binding commitments in its law through its Dispute Settlement Mechanism, rather than other international or regional organisations, particularly the WCO (Masserlin and Zarrouk, 2000; Duval, 2007; Wolffgang and Kafeero, 2014) . Even the WCO RKC tends to be merely as 'soft-law', which are in the forms of recommended practices, and therefore not easy to implement, these characteristic, diversity and greater flexibility, is very important in the context of international trade facilitation which involves a number of stakeholders including states, the private sector, NGOs, international organisations and many others Those aspects are mostly dealing with Customs works in practice. Moreover, implementing the WTO TFA in developing countries, particularly Category B and C, will remain tremendously uncertain since both donor's and developing countries' commitment will be tested, and also depend on both a transition period and a sufficient provision of capacity building and assistance (Elms, 2014) . Developing countries might be reluctant to change their national laws and customs rules and procedures, not because the changes are unimportant but they might want to minimise a detrimental impact on business practices and overhaul of their legal system (Hamanaka, 2014) . ensuring its conformity with the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and transforming it into national legal framework (Hikmahanto, 2016) . 20 These obligations must be carefully performed in order that international agreements really ensure its harmony with Indonesian constitution, give benefits to national state, and avoid international hidden intervention towards national sovereignty through international agreements (Hikmahanto Juwana, 2016) .
Conclusion
As mentioned above, in the context of Indonesian legal framework, the implementation of trade facilitation agenda under international agreements through the auspices of the WTO TFA must be further analysed in the context of Indonesian domestic law. It is a question of legal status and enforceability of international agreements in implementing trade facilitation agenda in Indonesia, with or without ratification process. Furthermore, the implementation of the agenda might also be in line with others agenda at the regional and national level, such as the WCO RKC and ASEAN Trade Facilitation agenda. Those agenda were reached to the same purpose of the WTO TFA: to speed up the movement of goods by regulating some provisions on trade facilitation elements.
The WTO TFA might be as 'soft-law' within Indonesian legal framework in implementing trade facilitation reform, with or without ratification instrument. The WTO TFA will only be applicable and enforceable if the implementation of the WTO TFA into Indonesian national legal system is also recognisable. In this respect, how the implementation of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (the WTO Agreement), the WCO RKC and ASEAN-FTA into Indonesian legal framework or domestic law should be looked at as a clue, as this is likely to give some clues as to how implementation of the WTO TFA is likely to proceed in Indonesia. 
